Bayad Sarwar Abdullah*1
International Relations and Diplomacy Department, Tishk International University, Erbil, 44001, Kurdistan Region, Iraq
Email: bayad.sarwar@tiu.edu.iq
DOI: 10.23918/ICABEP2025p253
Abstract:
This paper examines the post-2012 conflict between the United States and Turkey over Syria through a comparative analysis that centres NATO’s institutional crisis as a key explanatory factor. Drawing on neorealist theory, the study argues that divergent threat perceptions and strategic priorities—U.S. emphasis on counterterrorism and global stability versus Turkey’s focus on territorial integrity and the Kurdish threat—were amplified by a perceived decline in NATO cohesion and U.S. engagement in the Middle East. Methodologically, the paper compares policy decisions, military engagements, and diplomatic initiatives by the two states, and situates these within alliance dynamics and external developments such as the U.S. strategic retrenchment and the Astana process. The main research question of the study is how we can explain the conflict between the United States and Turkey over Syria after 2012, and to what extent did NATO’s institutional crisis shape or amplify that conflict? The findings show that NATO’s uneven response and the U.S. pivot away from decisive regional leadership reduced Ankara’s confidence in the alliance, prompting unilateral actions and closer tactical cooperation with non-NATO actors. The study concludes that NATO’s institutional crisis did not cause the conflict alone but functioned as a critical amplifier that shaped how the U.S. and Turkey prioritized competing security objectives in Syria. The paper offers policy-relevant implications for alliance management and crisis-resolution mechanisms.
Keywords: NATO; Syrian Conflict; U.S. foreign Policy; International Security; Turkey; Syrian Kurds